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ABSTRACT
AI is increasingly being offered ‘as a service’ (AIaaS). This entails
service providers offering customers access to pre-built AI models
and services, for tasks such as object recognition, text translation,
text-to-voice conversion, and facial recognition, to name a few. The
offerings enable customers to easily integrate a range of powerful
AI-driven capabilities into their applications. Customers access
these models through the provider’s APIs, sending particular data
to which models are applied, the results of which returned.
However, there are many situations in which the use of AI can
be problematic. AIaaS services typically represent generic function-
ality, available ‘at a click’. Providers may therefore, for reasons of
reputation or responsibility, seek to ensure that the AIaaS services
they offer are being used by customers for ‘appropriate’ purposes.
This paper introduces and explores the concept whereby AIaaS
providers uncover situations of possible service misuse by their
customers. Illustrated through topical examples, we consider the
technical usage patterns that could signal situations warranting
scrutiny, and raise some of the legal and technical challenges ofmon-
itoring for misuse. In all, by introducing this concept, we indicate a
potential area for further inquiry from a range of perspectives.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Artificial intelligence; •Com-
puter systems organization→Cloud computing; • Social and
professional topics→ Computing / technology policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has recently seen a surge of interest. It
is touted to influence many aspects of modern society, including in
areas such as health, agriculture, finance, transport, manufacturing,
retail, education, science, government and public services, to name
but a few.
At the same time, AI is coming under increasing scrutiny [5, 30].
As the discussions of ‘algorithmic accountability’, ‘AI regulation’
and ‘ethical AI’ make clear, there are many situations in which the
use of AI will be inappropriate, controversial and unlawful [16].
We increasingly see providers offering ‘AI as a Service’ (AIaaS). In
essence, AIaaS aims at providing the ML (machine learning)-driven
building blocks to support customer applications [26]. It includes
service providers offering access to a range of pre-built models
and related services, whereby customers can send to the service
particular inputs and receive back the results of a ML process, e.g.
predictions, classifications, etc. Offerings tend to be fairly generic1—
examples including object detection, text to voice synthesis, facial
recognition, and text translation (see §2.1)—and therefore can be
attractive to a range of customers, and suitable for driving applica-
tions across a number of scenarios and sectors. For instance, the
same object recognition service used by one customer for ware-
housing might be used by another to support video surveillance.
Interesting considerations are raised by AIaaS, given the services
make available sophisticated AI capabilities, often as ‘turnkey’ (on
demand, with a few clicks), to potentially anyone. That is, there is
much scope for AIaaS services to be used for controversial and prob-
lematic purposes. As a provocative example, facial recognition is an
AIaaS service offered by several providers, and intuitively has huge
potential for misuse and abuse [10]. In line with this, we have seen
providers setting out principles of use [21], being active in related
public discourse [13], and implementing simple technical barriers to
limit misuse (see §2). However even seemingly benign services also
have the potential to drive controversial applications, e.g. generic
object recognition services can assist military operations [38].
This paper provides an initial exploration into monitoring as a
means for facilitating greater oversight and governance of the use
of AIaaS. Providers appear to have an interest in such, be it for rea-
sons of reputation, e.g. to avoid the backlash where an unsavoury
application could be labelled as ‘Powered by [OrgX]’ or ‘[ProviderY]
Inside’™; or more generally, to help ensure that customer usage
accords with their terms of service, principles, or requirements.
Our concept of monitoring service usage might also work to in-
form future legal or regulatory regimes, which may demand more
accountability from those providing access to AI/ML services.
Specifically, we explore how AIaaS usage patterns could indi-
cate situations warranting attention, and highlight challenges and
opportunities for future work in the legal and technical spaces.
2 AIAAS OVERVIEW
AI is a broad term. In the context of AIaaS, it typically refers to
the use of machine learning (ML) (though we use ‘AI’ and ‘AIaaS’
to be consistent with the terminology used by providers in this
space). ML works to uncover patterns in data, to build and refine
representative models of that data [28]. These models can be used
to make classifications, predictions, and so forth.
There is significant interest in using ML to underpin a range of
applications. However, undertaking ML, i.e. building models, can be
challenging [41]. Organisations may have issues regarding access
to data – given that models are built on data, one requires access to
sufficient volumes of data to be representative of the problem space,
1Though tailoring is possible, and some offer consulting services for specific needs.
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and to enable model training and testing [8]. There are also issues
of access to resources. Training models can be computationally
expensive [8], so access to sufficient compute is a concern; as is ML
expertise, which is said to be in short supply [19].
Recognising an opportunity, we increasingly see providers offer-
ing AI as a Service (AIaaS). The motivation for AIaaS is that many
organisations will seek to leverage AI within their applications, but
may lack the data, resources, capabilities, or time to undertake and
maintain everything in-house. Indeed, this is similar to what drives
the uptake of cloud infrastructure more generally. Unsurprisingly,
we see that the prominent AIaaS providers are the tech giants, given
their access to data, infrastructure and expertise.
Broadly there are two categories of AIaaS, those that (i) provide
the infrastructure to support customers in undertaking their own
machine learning; and those that (ii) provide access to a range
of pre-built models and related services, whereby customers can
send to the service particular inputs and receive back results, e.g.
predictions, classifications, etc. Here we focus on the latter, using
‘AIaaS’ to refer to such (though some of the aspects we raise may
also be relevant to the more model building-oriented ML services).
In this way, by offering access to models, AIaaS essentially pro-
vides ‘application building blocks’ which enables customers (ten-
ants) to more easily integrate AI capabilities into the systems they
build and run. One can expect AIaaS to grow in prominence. This
is not only due to the increasing interest in AI, but also because
customers benefit through lower barriers to entry: on-demand and
pay-per-use reduces overheads in terms of engineering effort, cost
and time-to-market, and where issues of maintenance and scalabil-
ity are ‘outsourced’ to providers.
2.1 Types of services
AIaaS entails service providers offering their customers (tenants)
access to models via APIs (Application Programming Interfaces –
these facilitate the interaction between systems).
Typically, AIaaS offerings tend towards more generic tasks. We
observe that several AIaaS providers [12, 20], group their offerings
into four main categories:
Language services include text analytics (e.g. sentiment analysis),
translation (e.g. automated text translation like Google Translate,
language detection, etc.), language understanding and knowledge
base creation (e.g. from collections of questions and answers).
Analytics services comprise capabilities for the analysis of data for
various purposes, such as product recommendations (e.g. to deliver
personalised ads), anomaly detection (e.g. for detecting when data
behaviour changes), knowledge inference (e.g. to make predictions
or forecasts based on your data) and content moderation (e.g. to
detect offensive or unwanted images).
Speech services primarily comprise features such as text-to-speech,
speech-to-text, speaker recognition (i.e. identifying individuals
based on patterns in their speech), and so forth.
Vision services enable the analysing of images and videos in order
to find and identify objects, text, and labels, just to name a few.
Relevant to our later discussion, there are also offerings relating to
faces: Microsoft’s Azure Face [20] offers various APIs including face
verification, face detection, emotion recognition, face identification,
similar face search, celebrity recognition; Amazon Rekognition
offers a similar range of face-oriented services [2].
2.2 Accessing AIaaS
To integrate AI into their applications, AIaaS customers setup and
configure the services with possible customisations (which can
entail model training). This is usually done through a specialised
web interface supplied by the provider. Usage of the AIaaS service
entails sending requests (e.g. ‘find all faces in this image’) to the
provider’s API. The provider receives a request, and after conduct-
ing the required authentication and authorisation checks, processes
the request given and returns the response (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: A simplified illustration of AIaaS in which cloud
providers make AI technologies accessible to their cus-
tomers (tenants).
2.3 Transaction-oriented pricing
We explored the pricing model of three major providers, namely
Amazon, Microsoft and Google, focusing on their vision-related
AIaaS offerings. Despite subtle differences, the pricing structures
are largely similar across the providers. In general, the API calls
made can request one or more AI services (e.g., label detection,
face recognition, object detection, etc.) to be applied to their input
images. Azure’s vision pricing model [20] refers to each service
call as a transaction. Several AIaaS service requests can be grouped
into a single API call, but the tenant will be charged according to
the total number of services requested. The Amazon Rekognition
Image API pricing model for faces [2] charges per image analysed
and ‘for each set of facial feature vectors you store’. Google charges
per image [12], where ‘each feature applied to an image is a billable
unit’, again meaning that the cost incurred per image will vary
depending on the number of services applied to that image.
In short, all the major providers essentially bill in line with
usage, relating to API calls (requests/responses). This is relevant
as such billing methods naturally entail some monitoring, if only
for accountancy purposes. As such, billing may provide a starting
point for monitoring for misuse, as it implies providers already
employ some means for monitoring transactions, and that some
data is available regarding the transactions themselves.
3 POTENTIAL FOR MISUSE
The potential for the misuse of AI in general has been the subject of
much attention. There are a number of examples of inappropriate
uses of machine learning. One example is the infamous attempt to
use deep learning to predict a person’s sexual orientation from a
photograph, which was widely criticised for many reasons, includ-
ing that such applications would have much potential for misuse in
terms of supporting persecution and hate crime [22]. In the facial
recognition context, there has been much debate regarding the
acceptability of such technologies, leading some governments to
institute a ban on their use by the public sector [6]. The recent
media coverage of police use of facial recognition on protesters in
Hong Kong [39] has sparked fears of persecution. The installation
of facial recognition systems in London raised privacy concerns [7].
Given the discussion around ethical AI, algorithmic account-
ability, and so forth, technology companies have joined efforts
in self-regulation [29], and defining principles regarding AI. For
instance, the Partnership on AI, founded by Amazon, Facebook,
Google, DeepMind, Microsoft, and IBM—who incidentally are the
prime AIaaS providers—lists six core tenets of AI: 1) safety-critical,
2) fair, transparent, and accountable, 3) labor and economy, 4) col-
laboration with people, 5) social and societal influences, and 6) AI
and social good [29]. Many have their own principles of AI ethics;
Google’s states that AI should protect privacy and be socially bene-
ficial, fair, safe, and accountable to people, while IBM’s focuses on
trust and transparency [29].
Despite this attention on the potential risks of AI, there has been
considerably less focus on AI when offered as a service, and the
potential for cloud-based AI services to be misused by tenants.
We argue that this warrants consideration. We have seen that
seemingly innocuous technology can quickly be re-purposed as the
building blocks for nefarious applications. ‘Deepfakes’, the use of
AI to superimpose another person’s face in a video, can be easily
built using Google’s open-sourced software with readily accessible
tutorials, raising risks that it will be used to spread misinformation,
threaten national security, or create pornography depicting non-
consenting individuals [14].
AIaaS presents a challenge, given that it deliberately aims to
make widely accessible sophisticated AI that is capable of under-
pinning a broad range of applications. This ‘out-of-the-box’ access
to such functionality makes it likely that AIaaS will be used, mali-
ciously or otherwise, by some customers for controversial purposes.
3.1 Monitoring AIaaS
There are various reasons why providers might become active in
monitoring and auditing how their AIaaS offerings are being used.
Monitoring and audit supports providers in taking a proactive role,
by indicating situations that require attention and enabling the
mitigation of negative outcomes.
A key driver is reputation. Given the potential concerns regarding
the use of AI for particular purposes, a controversial application
being branded as ‘Powered by [Provider_X]’ could lead to public
backlash and undesirable attention. This is particularly the case
for AIaaS, given that such services provide access to fairly generic
models that could be used for a wide variety of purposes.
Providers also typically define in their terms of services particular
responsibilities and obligations of use. Providers may therefore be
encouraged to employ some monitoring as a means for indicating
situations where breaches may be taking place. Moreover, given
that much value lies within the models being accessed, providers
may seek to prevent data being leaked or aspects of the model being
‘stolen’, e.g. through model inversion attacks [32].
Indeed, there is evidence of AIaaS providers beginning to con-
sider such issues, though so far this has tended only to concern
specific, more obviously ‘risky’ offerings – particularly facial recog-
nition. For example, Google does not provide facial recognition as a
service due to its potential for abuse [37], while Microsoft has been
involved in the broader public discussion around such issues [31]
and denied police access to its facial recognition technology [17].
In terms of technical measures, Microsoft limits the request rate to
their Face API, while Amazon prevents more than 100 faces from
being detected in single image [2], both of which may work to
mitigate misuse. That said, more general frameworks regarding the
appropriate uses of AIaaS, and how these would be monitored, so
far have had little discussion.
Conversely, providers may be hesitant to become more involved
in monitoring the use of their services. First, their customers (ten-
ants) may not accept their activity being monitored, perhaps due
to, for example, the nature or commercial sensitivity of their under-
takings. Indeed, trust regarding cloud providers is a long-standing
issue [27]. Further, monitoring could result in an increased liability
exposure for the provider (see §5.1).
However, there is also an argument that AIaaS providers should
play a greater role in monitoring their services. In addition to the
points just mentioned, this is because providers (and indeed, their
customers) profit from the offering of low-cost access to powerful
ML services for use at scale. Moreover, while the misuse of cloud
infrastructure services may be a general concern [15, 18], AIaaS
warrants particular consideration, not only due to the potential for
AI misuse, but also because such services mean the provider plays a
more direct role in enabling application functionality. As such, one
could envisage providers incentivised to take a more proactive role,
be it through their own volition, given the demands for greater tech-
accountability, or as a result of the evolving regulatory landscape.
We discuss some legal aspects in greater depth in §5.1, though
reiterate that the purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept
and the potential of AIaaS monitoring and audit, in order to provide
the groundwork for future discussion and research.
4 MONITORING FOR AIaaS MISUSE
There are several ways that providers could employ tighter gover-
nance regimes in AIaaS contexts. This could include, for instance,
changing how services are offered, such as requiring initial consult-
ing and application vetting rather than ‘turnkey’ service access (as
some do), requiring specifications of use inline with well-defined
and context-specific terms of service provisions, and so forth.
However, given the current and well-established model for cloud
(and AIaaS) procurement—which is ‘turnkey’, on-demand, through
automatic, tech-driven processes—we consider howprovidersmight
technically discover that their AIaaS services are being used inap-
propriately. Our focus is in line with the current way AIaaS operates,
where providers are fairly ‘hands-off’ with regards to how their
services are procured and integrated by customers.
In essence, our concept involves exploring how monitoring and
analysing customer usage of AIaaS services may help providers un-
cover situations warranting review or further investigation. We em-
phasise that such an approach, which involves examining patterns
of use, transactions, etc., will often only be indicative of possible
Table 1: Possible information sources to support the auditing of AIaaS usage.
Category Sub-category Examples
Transaction raw data
Metadata Start time, client IP address, size of input parameters, resource usage, . . .
Request Input parameters, such as images, videos, audio files, . . .
Response Information returned to the clients during a transaction (e.g., detected faces)
Request processing by-products Generated information (e.g., face encoding) as part of the request processing
Derived data Data structures or ML models obtained from the raw and by-product data
misuse rather than absolute, yet remains useful in highlighting
potential problems as they occur and in enabling responses. This
offers much potential compared to the alternative of ‘running blind’.
Fig. 2 presents a high-level conceptual representation of a generic
AIaaS misuse detection architecture. The concept illustrates a com-
ponent calledAudit Informer, which obtains and derives the relevant
data to drive the analysis and detection of potential situations of
concern. Some of this data might relate to that already collected
by providers (via the Operational Monitor) in order to, for example,
enable billing (which is transaction oriented, see §2.3), managing
performance and other resources, etc. The Misuse Detector compo-
nent involves analysing and processing the audit information as a
means for identifying and alerting of potential AIaaS misuse.
Commercial
organizations
Tenants
Public sector
bodies
AIaaSOperational monitor
Request
Response
Audit informer
Misuse detector
Microsoft
Amazon
Google
Cloud provider
Figure 2: A conceptual AIaaS misuse detection architecture.
4.1 Audit information
Detecting AIaaS misuse requires information. There may be a range
of ‘signals’ available to a cloud provider. Table 1 presents some
categories of information that may be relevant, which include:
• Transaction raw data: Includes three main sub-categories,
namely request metadata (e.g., timestamp, size, account cre-
dentials), request specifics (e.g., input parameters such as
images, audio clips, etc.), and response specifics (e.g., out-
puts from the model such as predictions or classifications).
Note that some of this may already be collected by providers
(Operation Monitor), e.g. to support billing.
• Request processing by-products: Includes data generated in
serving the request, which can contain, for example, any
input data pre-processing, internal processing pipelines, col-
lation of results from multiple services, intermediary feature
vectors, etc.
• Derived data: Concerns data processed or derived from trans-
action logs, request by products, etc, to assist detection and
analysis. This could include, for example, creating structured
log files, bloom filters, models and representations of typical
usage (encoding usage patterns, inputs, output results), etc.
4.2 Uncovering misuse
We now discuss detecting potential cases of misuse. The concept
entails misuse indicators, which reflect certain criteria of tenant
behaviour that may warrant some, or indeed, further attention. The
implementation of an indicator entails an analysis of the relevant
audit information sources to determine whether the particular cri-
teria has been met. In practice, there are many possible types and
forms of indicators, some generic and some context-specific. In
this section we present the general concept to offer a way forward,
using facial recognition as an illustrative example [10].
4.2.1 Specific misuse indicators. There will be situations in which
providers will have some knowledge or foresight as to the partic-
ular risks of a particular service, or the forms that misuse might
take. For instance, in facial recognition contexts, some concerns
relate to population surveillance, personal privacy, and use by state
services [3, 40].
Table 2 presents some specific examples of misuse indicators for
vision and face-based AIaaS services and their category of risk. We
now elaborate these (with reference to Fig. 2 and Table 1):
• High request rate for face services: If the tenant’s request rate
for face services is high, it possibly indicates facial recog-
nition deployment at-scale (e.g., population surveillance).
Indeed, we see a rate limiting approach already employed by
Microsoft [20]. Request rate patterns are easily derived from
the transaction metadata already captured by platforms.
• Large number of faces in an image/video: Also concerned with
surveillance, this indicator targets whether tenants appear
to be analysing crowds by looking for many faces within
the same input. We note Amazon AWS limits the number of
faces detected in any image [2], though it is unclear if this is
due to surveillance concerns.
• Large number of different faces are analysed : A consistent use
of a service to uncover different faces over time could also
indicate a population surveillance scenario. This indicator
could include considering aspects such as the frequency
and volume of faces matched (i.e. numbers regarding input/
output faces), to more sophisticated (and potentially more
intrusive and legally-challenging) approaches, which might
involve, for example, recording and analysing the raw input
images or other details of the faces involved.
• Large number of identification attempts for particular indi-
vidual(s):2 This concerns a tenant searching for a similar
face across a large number of images coming from different
contexts, suggesting the targeting and tracking of particular
2Identification in this context is described as a one-to-many comparison [10], i.e.
‘looking for’ individual(s).
Table 2: Some examples of some AIaaS misuse indicators for object and facial recognition services.
Technical indicator for vision and face services Potential implications
High request rate for face detection Population surveillance
Large number of faces in an image/video Population surveillance
Large number of different faces are analysed Population surveillance
Large number of identification attempts for particular individual(s) Privacy threats to an individual
Detection of ‘black-listed’ objects Controversial application
individual(s). Such an analysis might involve keeping records
of the inputs/outputs to particular services, the results of
processing, etc.
• Detection of ‘black-listed’ objects: This indicator looks for
certain categories of items that might generally be of a type
indicating a problematic application. For example, repeated
detection of placards, or ‘violence’ could indicate that the
technology is being used to screen protests. Moreover, this
example illustrates the relevance of monitoring across differ-
ent AIaaS services; e.g. detecting blacklisted objects and faces
from the same inputs, such as placards (object detection) and
multiple faces (facial recognition), may be revealing.
4.2.2 Misuse discovery through patterns of behaviour. There will
also be situations where a specific risk might not have been fore-
seen, but where the usage pattern itself might indicate a need for
further scrutiny. This entails building profiles of AIaaS usage for
and across particular services. Analysis might involve using, for
example, anomaly detection methods [4] to indicate potentially
problematic usage patterns. This is similar to how such methods
are used in the security domain, e.g. for intrusion detection, where
changes in network traffic can indicate that a system has been
compromised [1].
This idea could useful by indicating where the behaviour of a
customer deviates from their normal usage pattern. For instance,
if a customer transaction begins using a face recognition API far
more extensively than previously, or integrates face detection with
other services having not previously done so, it might warrant
further investigation. Similarly, one can compare the usage profiles
across customers. Assuming most customers (as organisations with
responsibilities) are behaving appropriately, detecting a particular
usage pattern that contrasts to that of others may warrant attention.
A further example concerns patterns indicating a model inver-
sion attack [11], whereby tenants may be attempting to reverse-
engineer the classification-criteria or training data from the model
itself. Given the value of AIaaS is in the model, and the potential
legal implications should models encode personal data (see [36]),
this might be of particular concern for providers. Such attacks may
require coordination from across a range of accounts, and there ap-
pears space for exploring the use of ML/anomaly detection towards
detecting such situations.
5 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES &
OPPORTUNITIES
So far we have introduced the concept of AIaaS monitoring as a
means for indicating possible misuse. This section discusses some
relevant legal and technical considerations, highlighting some in-
teresting practical challenges and opportunities for future work.
5.1 Legal
AIaaS providers monitoring customers’ use of their services and
models may have legal consequences. We now explore these in
relation to data protection law and intermediary liability, noting
this is an area requiring further consideration. As such, rather than
undertaking an in-depth analysis of the various legal issues and
questions potentially arising from monitoring AIaaS, we highlight
some considerations with a view to exploring these questions in
greater detail in subsequent work. Note that, as well as the issues
discussed below, further considerations are likely to arise in relation
to the enforcement of contractual provisions and terms of service
applying between AIaaS providers and their customers.
5.1.1 Data protection. Under the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [34] (and similar legislation in other jurisdic-
tions), some of the audit information described abovemay be classed
as personal data (i.e. any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person [GDPR Art 4.1]). Depending on the
specifics, this would likely include much information that we have
categorised in Table 1 as ‘transaction raw data’, such as metadata
(IP address), input parameters, and the information returned to
clients, and some kinds of processing by-products. Note, however,
that the operational metrics described earlier and some derived data
are unlikely to be personal data, should they entail, for instance,
aggregated or more general information about customers’ use of
services (e.g., regarding transactions, rates of service use, etc).
GDPR establishes a framework governing the processing of per-
sonal data (essentially any use or operation on personal data [GDPR
Art 4.2]), with strict compliance requirements and potentially se-
rious penalties for non-compliance. AIaaS providers who process
personal data in monitoring customers’ use of their services, as in
some of the monitoring methods this paper proposes, are likely to
be data controllers [GDPR Art 4.7] for that monitoring – as they
determine its means (how they are doing it) and its purposes (why
they are doing it). This means they would then be subject to the
GDPR’s extensive compliance obligations [GDPR Art 5.2].
Providers may in practice be unable to determine which of the
data that they are processing is personal data without first process-
ing it. As a result, providers might best, in processing such kinds
of audit information, take a precautionary approach that treats all
of the data that has the potential to be personal as personal data.
Moreover, GDPR recognises certain ‘special categories’ of personal
data that are particularly sensitive [GDPR Art 9]. Given the inability
to determine which data falls into one of these categories without
processing it, cloud providers may need to treat large swathes of
data for monitoring as if it was special category.
All personal data processing requires a basis in law [GDPR Arts
5, 6, 9]. The available bases for processing special category data are
restricted [GDPR Art 9], and it’s likely that only explicit consent
of data subjects (individuals to whom personal data relates) would
be available in these circumstances. It is not obvious how AIaaS
providers could identify the data subjects to seek or obtain their
explicit consent to the processing for monitoring without first pro-
cessing the data in question. In circumstances where personal data
is likely to be involved, cloud providers monitoring tenants’ use
of models would therefore face a dilemma. They will not in many
cases be able to monitor without the explicit consent of any data
subjects whose special category data will be processed in doing so.
Without processing the data, they would be unlikely to be able to
identify data subjects in order to obtain their explicit consent.
5.1.2 Intermediary liability. Many jurisdictions provide online plat-
forms with protection from liability for any hosted content that
might be illegal or unlawful in some way. In different jurisdictions,
this protection may be given on a blanket basis, or may be qualified
in some way or subject to certain conditions. In the EU, this is
provided for in the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) [33]. Protection
from liability is available to service providers who store informa-
tion on behalf of users of their services by passive, technical means,
so long as the provider does not have actual knowledge of any
illegality [ECD Art 14, recital 42]. If the provider acquires such
knowledge, they are obliged to remove the illegal information or
activity expeditiously [ECD Art 14].
It is uncertain whether cloud providers offering AIaaS could avail
of liability protections for hosting, due to the nature of the active
role they play in providing that service. The current jurisprudence
of the European Court of Justice indicates that, in some circum-
stances, service providers who take an active role may go beyond
activities for which protection from liability is provided [24][25].
However, the Court’s case law is currently unclear on precisely
which kinds of activities would involve a provider taking such a role
(although note that, as of December 2019, the Court is considering
a case that may provide an opportunity the clarify the law in this
area [23]).
Here, AIaaS providers are not simply offering a hosting facility
by purely passive, technical means, but rather, offer access to sophis-
ticated models that classify, predict, make decisions, etc. Providers
may therefore have some liability for their use. However, if they can
ordinarily avail of that protection, actively monitoring tenants’ ac-
tivities could take them outside of that protection. In order to avoid
legal repercussions, they would be obliged to expeditiously remove
or prevent access to any content or activity that their monitoring
determined to be illegal. Cloud providers might therefore prefer
to ‘play dumb’ in order to avoid triggering any obligations and
legal risks under the Directive. This is an interesting area requiring
further investigation.
5.1.3 Future. Note, however, that in some jurisdictions, includ-
ing the EU, there are proposals for reforming the law around the
responsibilities of online platforms. Several of these propose to
place greater responsibilities on platforms around the information
they host or process (e.g. [9, 35]). This may put providers under
obligations to monitor use of their models (which, given that they
are providing access to powerful probabilistic models at scale and
with a low barrier to entry, may not be an unreasonable develop-
ment). If monitoring became explicitly required by law, that could
potentially also allow them to circumvent the problems with ob-
taining explicit consent from data subjects. This is because GDPR
provides a legal basis for processing special category data where
doing so is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest and
is undertaken on the basis of EU or Member State law that provides
for sufficient safeguards for data subject rights [GDPR Art 9].
5.2 Technical
Monitoring for AIaaS misuse by platforms also raises a number
interesting technical challenges and opportunities for research.
A key area of research concerns the technical mechanisms to
support oversight, which includes (i) technical monitoring architec-
tures, and (ii) the analysis and development of misuse indicators.
Some approachesmay aim to operate generally, while others may be
more context/application-specific. Work on intrusion detection and
threat monitoring in networked contexts (§4.2.2), as well as work on
provenance [30], appear relevant as possible starting points. Testing
and ensuring that the indicators are meaningful and accurate is
also an area for consideration.
Another aspect relates to performance. Service providers nat-
urally seek to optimise the performance and reduce the resource
requirements of the services that they offer. At the same time, mon-
itoring entails overhead (e.g. processing, storage, etc.). As such,
there are opportunities for research into quantifying the overheads
and other impacts of various monitoring and detection processes.
Note again that some aspects, such as request metadata, are likely
already to be captured by providers, such as to assist with billing
(§2.3), and so there may be ways to develop monitoring methods
that leverage these to avoid adding substantial extra overheads.
Further, and in line with the above discussion, there may well be
legal issues and liability implications from providers undertaking
monitoring, and more generally, being more actively involved in
policing the use of their services. The specifics of any potential
increase in liability exposure will certainly depend on the circum-
stances. Such concerns also represent opportunities for technical
research; examples include devising indicators and methods for
monitoring that are more privacy and data-protection ‘friendly’.
6 CONCLUSION
AIaaS makes accessible a wide range of sophisticated and scalable
AI services for customers to integrate into their applications. These
services act as application ‘building blocks’, which are potentially
accessible by anyone. ‘Turnkey’ access to such services reduces the
direct interactions with the provider, and so too the opportunities
for oversight and intervention. It is therefore foreseeable that there
will be situations in which AIaaS is used for controversial purposes,
be it intentionally or otherwise.
While issues surrounding AI ethics, regulation and responsibility
are currently the subject of much discussion, the potential for AIaaS
misuse has had comparatively little attention. This is important, as
given the complexity, data and skills required for ML undertakings,
it is likely that AIaaS will become a dominant part of the technical
infrastructure underpinning AI-driven applications. There appears
a role for AIaaS providers to be more active in governing the use of
their offerings, be it for reasons of reputation or responsibility – not
least given the growing demands for greater tech-accountability.
In this paper, we used illustrative examples to highlight related
issues, providing an initial conceptual overview of how providers
might work towards ensuring more responsible use of their services.
We also indicated the potential challenges and opportunities for
moving forward, both from a legal and technical perspective.
In all, by presenting this concept, we seek to draw attention to
AIaaS and its usage as an area warranting further consideration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge the financial support of the Engineering & Physi-
cal Sciences Research Council, University of Cambridge, Microsoft
via the Microsoft Cloud Computing Research Centre, and Aviva.
REFERENCES
[1] Mohiuddin Ahmed, Abdun Naser Mahmood, and Jiankun Hu. 2016. A Survey
of Network Anomaly Detection Techniques. Journal of Network and Computer
Applications 60 (2016), 19–31.
[2] Amazon. 2019. Build an AI-driven Application. https://aws.amazon.com/machine-
learning/ai-services/
[3] Miles Brundage, Shahar Avin, Jack Clark, Helen Toner, Peter Eckersley, Ben
Garfinkel, Allan Dafoe, Paul Scharre, Thomas Zeitzoff, Bobby Filar, et al. 2018. The
Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.07228 (2018).
[4] Varun Chandola, Arindam Banerjee, and Vipin Kumar. 2009. Anomaly Detection:
A Survey. ACM computing surveys (CSUR) 41, 3 (2009), 15.
[5] J. Cobbe. 2019. Administrative Law and the Machines of Government: Judicial
Review of Automated Public-Sector Decision-Making. Legal Studies (2019).
[6] Kate Conger, Richard Fausset, and Serge F Kovaleski. 2019. San Francisco Bans
Facial Recognition Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-
recognition-ban-san-francisco.html
[7] Sabbagh Dan. 2019. Facial Recognition Technology Scrapped at King’s Cross
Site. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/02/facial-recognition-
technology-scrapped-at-kings-cross-development
[8] Jared Dean. 2014. Big data, data mining, and machine learning value creation for
business leaders and practitioners / Jared Dean. Wiley, Hoboken.
[9] Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. 2019. Online Harms White Paper,
CP 57. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf
[10] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2019. Facial Recognition Tech-
nology: Fundamental Rights Considerations in the Context of Law Enforcement.
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2019/facial-recognition
[11] Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. 2015. Model Inversion
Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures. In Proc.
ACM SIGSAC. ACM, 1322–1333.
[12] Google. 2019. AI and machine learning products. https://cloud.google.com/
products/ai/building-blocks/
[13] Google. 2019. Our approach to facial recongition. https://ai.google/responsibilities/
facial-recognition/
[14] Douglas Harris. 2018. Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot
Protect You. Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 17 (2018), 99.
[15] Keiko Hashizume, Nobukazu Yoshioka, and Eduardo B Fernandez. 2013. Three
Misuse Patterns for Cloud Computing. In Security Engineering for Cloud Comput-
ing: Approaches and Tools. IGI Global, 36–53.
[16] Dirk Helbing. 2019. Societal, economic, ethical and legal challenges of the digital
revolution: from big data to deep learning, artificial intelligence, andmanipulative
technologies. In Towards Digital Enlightenment. Springer, 47–72.
[17] Vincent James. 2019. Microsoft Denied Police Facial Recognition Tech Over Hu-
man Rights Concerns. https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/17/18411757/microsoft-
facial-recognition-sales-refused-police-access
[18] Jens Lindemann. 2015. Towards Abuse Detection and Prevention in IaaS Cloud
Computing. In 2015 10th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security. IEEE, 211–217.
[19] Bernard Marr. 2018. The AI Skills Crisis And How To Close The
Gap. https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/06/25/the-ai-skills-crisis-
and-how-to-close-the-gap/
[20] Microsoft. 2019. Cognitive Services. https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/services/
cognitive-services
[21] Microsoft. 2019. Six Principles For Developing and Deploying Facial Recognition
Technology. https://blogs.microsoft.com/wp-content/uploads/prod/sites/5/2018/
12/MSFT-Principles-on-Facial-Recognition.pdf
[22] Arianne E Miller. 2018. Searching for Gaydar: Blind Spots in the Study of Sexual
Orientation Perception. Psychology & Sexuality 9, 3 (2018), 188–203.
[23] European Court of Justice. [n.d.]. LF v YouTube (C-682/18).
[24] European Court of Justice. 2010. Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis
Vuitton (C-236/08) ECLI:EU:C:2010:159.
[25] European Court of Justice. 2011. L’Orèal SA and Others v eBay International AG
and Others (C-324/09) ECLI:EU:C:2011:474.
[26] Saeedeh Parsaeefard, Iman Tabrizian, and Alberto Leon-Garcia. 2019. Arti-
ficial Intelligence as a Services (AI-aaS) on Software-Defined Infrastructure.
arXiv:cs.LG/1907.05505
[27] Siani Pearson and Azzedine Benameur. 2010. Privacy, Security and Trust Issues
Arising from Cloud Computing. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Second Interna-
tional Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CLOUDCOM ’10).
IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 693–702.
[28] Junfei Qiu, Qihui Wu, Guoru Ding, Yuhua Xu, and Shuo Feng. 2016. A Survey
of Machine Learning for Big Data Processing. Eurasip Journal on Advances in
Signal Processing 2016, 1 (2016).
[29] Francesca Rossi. 2019. Building Trust in Artificial Intelligence. Journal of inter-
national affairs 72, 1 (2019), 127–134.
[30] J. Singh, J. Cobbe, and C. Norval. 2019. Decision Provenance: Harnessing Data
Flow for Accountable Systems. IEEE Access 7 (2019), 6562–6574. https://doi.org/
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2887201
[31] Brad Smith. 2018. Facial Recognition: It’s Time for Action. https://blogs.microsoft.
com/on-the-issues/2018/12/06/facial-recognition-its-time-for-action/
[32] Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart.
2016. Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium. 601–618.
[33] European Union. 2000. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce
Directive) OJ L 178.
[34] European Union. 2016. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L 119.
[35] European Union. 2019. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital
Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC OJ L 130.
[36] Michael Veale, Reuben Binns, and Lilian Edwards. 2018. Algorithms that remem-
ber: model inversion attacks and data protection law. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 376, 2133
(2018), 20180083. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0083
[37] Kent Walker. 2018. AI for Social Good in Asia Pacific. https://www.blog.google/
around-the-globe/google-asia/ai-social-good-asia-pacific/amp/
[38] Sarah Whittaker. 2018. What’s The Big Deal? The Controversy on Google’s AI
and Pentagon Drones. https://dronebelow.com/2018/03/08/whats-the-big-deal-
the-controversy-on-googles-ai-and-pentagon-drones/
[39] Doffman Zak. 2019. Hong Kong Exposes Both Sides Of China’s Relentless Facial
Recognition Machine. https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/
26/hong-kong-exposes-both-sides-of-chinas-relentless-facial-recognition-
machine/
[40] Yi Zeng, Enmeng Lu, Yinqian Sun, and Ruochen Tian. 2019. Responsible Facial
Recognition and Beyond. arXiv:1909.12935 (2019).
[41] Lina Zhou, Shimei Pan, JianwuWang, and Athanasios V. Vasilakos. 2017. Machine
Learning on Big Data: Opportunities and Challenges. Neurocomputing 237,
December 2016 (2017), 350–361.
